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1. Introduction 
Stable governance and institutional arrangements are important for long-term transport planning 
and delivery. There are different arrangements across the world aiming to achieve three related 
elements of good planning: integrating land use and transport planning, integrating planning 
across transport modes, and integrating planning and operations in transport. For instance, 
Legacy et al. (2009) reviewed governance for land use-transport integration policy in 
Melbourne and Perth, while Stone (2009) contrasted the role of planners in transport policy in 
Melbourne and Vancouver in the last four decades. The difficulties of integrated transport in 
Great Britain, including the lack of will of politicians, civil servants and the public, have been 
discussed by Preston (2010). More broadly, Fuller (2010, p. 1134) suggested “the processes of 
institutional change in urban governance are multidimensional, characterised by tensions 
produced through interaction of inherited and emergent arrangements”.  
Within public transport, Ponnaluri (2011) identified the important role of decisive leadership 
and strong institutions, characterised by accountability, commitment and strong political will, in 
delivering bus rapid transit in India. Mees (2010) reviewed the recent planning process for 
major rail projects in Victoria, the Melbourne Metro and Regional Rail Link, which involved 
federal government funding. In the search for better structures for transport, there are cycles of 
aggregation and disaggregation of both planning and operational units to improve transport 
outcomes. For instance, Meligrana (1999) discusses the evolving institutional structure and 
governance of transportation planning, policy development and transit delivery in the Greater 
Vancouver area, moving towards full regional integration. On the scale of operational units, 
Viton (1993) found many public urban transit providers in the San Francisco Bay Area could 
realise cost economies by consolidating into larger systems. 
But while the importance of governance and institutional arrangements is recognised, there has 
been less attention on the impact of political discontinuity in governance. Some change is 
expected when government changes from one political party to another, and in transport plans 
when circumstances change. NSW in Australia provides a case study of the impacts of 
discontinuity in governance within the same political administration. There was continuity of 
government with a Labor government in power from 1995 to 2011 winning four consecutive 
four-year terms, and a commitment to public transport as a strategic objective in the 
government’s strategic transport and land use plans. But an unprecedented period of change 
since 2003 in terms of premiers, ministers for transport, and institutional changes disrupted 
public transport planning and had significant impacts on long-term strategic transport planning, 
best seen in the delayed implementation of public transport projects. Conflicts over funding of 
transport contributed to the changes in premiers and ministers, and the subsequent impact on 
projects. Legacy et al. (2009) identified that common governance issues included the lack of 
funding and resources for sustainable transport. The discontinuity in NSW is all the more 
remarkable due to the longevity of the same political party in power.  
The paper is organised in as follows. Firstly, section 2 identifies and discusses significant 
governance changes in NSW since 2003 using a timeline approach, identifying changes in 
premiers, ministers and departments responsible for transport planning, the reasons for these 
changes, and the associated significant announcements in transport planning including changes 
to transport projects and strategic plans. Section 3 analyses the contribution of funding conflicts 
to the discontinuity and section 4 analyses the impacts of discontinuity including delays to 
transport projects, particularly the North West Rail Link, and loss of trust and confidence 
amongst stakeholders including the community, planning professionals and federal government. 
Rather than a public transport legacy, discontinuity in governance has left a legacy for NSW of 
a poor transport reputation with stakeholders: the community, federal and local government, and 
the private sector. 
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2. Discontinuity in governance and transport  
Major points of discontinuity in governance in NSW from 2003 onwards, and the subsequent 
impacts on transport planning, are identified using a timeline approach. Figure 1 summarises the 
relationship between the timing of key events. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Relationship between changes in governance in NSW (January 2003 to June 2011) 
See Appendix A for Tables of supporting information. 
2.1 Premier Carr – new ministers and transport institutions 
The first two four-year terms of the NSW Labor Government from April 1995 to 2003 were 
defined by stability in both the Premier Bob Carr, Transport Minister, and Department of 
Transport. The government’s transport strategy Action for Transport Sydney 2010 (NSW 
Department of Transport 1998), released in November 1998 shortly before the March 1999 state 
election, was committed to public transport. It included the Parramatta Rail Link by 2006, the 
North West Rail Link by 2010, and a network of Transitways for western Sydney, as well as 
other rail and road projects. 
Following the March 2003 state election when the NSW Labor government was returned for its 
third term, there was a major portfolio restructure amongst transport and planning agencies with 
new Ministers. A new mega-department, the Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural 
Resources (DIPNR), was created for land use and transport planning, combining most of the 
branches of the former Department of Planning, the transport planning function from the 
Department of Transport, the infrastructure coordination function from Premiers Department, 
and the Department of Natural Resources. DIPNR had over 5,000 staff, with most in natural 
resources.  
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To reflect the policy focus of the new smaller department, the former Department of Transport 
was renamed the Ministry of Transport, with a Minister for Transport Services. The portfolio 
title “Transport Services” rather than “Transport” reflected that transport infrastructure planning 
was now part of the new DIPNR. The Ministry of Transport’s new role was providing policy 
advice and strategic support to the Minister, while also focusing on operational transport 
services (NSW Ministry of Transport 2003). 
Institutional changes of creating and merging departments on the scale of DIPNR and the 
rebuilding of the Ministry of Transport require much time and energy from both management 
and staff. Much of the short life of DIPNR was occupied in structuring and restructuring the 
Department to meet its new objectives, and determining the division of responsibility for 
transport planning and policy issues between DIPNR and the new Ministry of Transport. 
An early transport casualty of the institutional split between transport policy and planning was 
in mid 2003 when the Minister for Transport Services announced that the Epping-Parramatta 
western half of the Parramatta Rail Link would be deferred, due to forecast low patronage and 
increasing construction costs. There was considerable uncertainty about what the deferral meant 
in practice. 
In January 2005, less than two years after the March 2003 election, there were new Ministers for 
Transport and Roads, following the unexpected resignation of the Treasurer, leading to a 
Ministerial reshuffle.  
In June 2005, Premier Carr made a major transport announcement of the $8 billion Metropolitan 
Rail Expansion Program made up of three new links: North West Rail Link in 2017, South West 
Rail Link in 2012 and the CBD (or Harbour) Rail Link in 2017, with north west and south west 
extensions from 2020 (NSW Government 2005). The North West and South West Rail Links 
were publicly known and planning was underway for both. While the South West Rail Link was 
to be funded 75% by infrastructure contributions from development of the South West Growth 
Centre and 25% by the state government, the larger and more expensive North West Rail Link 
was not funded as part of the North West Growth Centre infrastructure package. The CBD Rail 
Link had not been previously publicly announced, but the need for increased rail capacity 
through the CBD and across the harbour had been recognised within rail agencies and planning 
was underway (DIPNR et al. 2003). 
2.2 Premier Iemma – new ministers, transport institutions and plans 
After 10 years as Premier, Premier Carr announced his resignation in July 2005 which triggered 
a chain of events with major implications for transport planning. In August 2005, Morris Iemma 
became Premier. The Minister for Infrastructure and Planning, a potential candidate for Premier, 
resigned from Parliament, as did the long-standing Deputy Premier. This resulted in a number of 
ministerial and departmental changes, as departments were restructured to align with the new 
ministerial hierarchy. The integrated transport and land use planning department DIPNR was 
disbanded, with the re-establishment of the former Department of Planning under a new 
Minister for Planning. With the restructure, senior staff left including the Director-General of 
DIPNR and the Deputy Director-General (Office of the Metropolitan Region). The Executive 
Director Transport Planning had already left as part of an earlier restructure of DIPNR. 
The government’s 25 year strategic plan for Sydney, the Metropolitan Strategy – City of Cities: 
A Plan for Sydney’s Future (NSW Government 2005b), released in December 2005, set 
principles for the location of new housing and jobs, based on integrating transport and land use, 
and had a stated commitment to public transport. The Transport Chapter supported the 
previously announced Metropolitan Rail Expansion Program.  
In 2006, there were further ministerial changes with a new Minister for Roads in February 2006, 
and for six months from October 2006 to March 2007, the Minister for Roads was also Minister 
Assisting the Minister for Transport (Buses and Ferries). 
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Less than a year after the Metropolitan Strategy, a new strategic transport plan was released in 
November 2006, shortly before the state election in March 2007. The Urban Transport 
Statement (NSW Government 2006) was prepared by the Premiers Department rather than the 
Ministry of Transport and was significant both for its governance and transport impacts. In 
terms of institutional change, the Urban Transport Statement recommended the creation of a 
Centre for Transport Planning and Product Development in the Ministry of Transport and the 
transfer of the transport planning function from the Department of Planning back to the Ministry 
of Transport. In terms of transport, the Urban Transport Statement continued the government’s 
commitment to public transport and announced the acceleration of the North West Rail Link, 
with Stage 1 from Epping to Hills Centre to be delivered by 2015, two years early, and a 
commitment to plan for metro rail lines.  
The NSW government’s State Plan: A New Direction for NSW to set priorities and targets for 
government agencies (NSW Government 2006b), also released in November 2006, included 
several targets committed to public transport including increasing the share of peak hour 
journeys on a safe and reliable public transport system, and cleaner air and reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions, as well as road efficiency and safer roads.  
At the March 2007 state election, the Labor government was returned for its fourth four-year 
term. Compared to the aftermath of the previous state election in 2003, there was a period of 
relative stability. The Premier and Minister for Transport (also the Deputy Premier) continued in 
their positions, and the Ministry of Transport and the Department of Planning continued 
implementing the Urban Transport Statement and the Metropolitan Strategy.  
2.3  Premier Rees – new ministers and transport projects 
In 2008 there were remarkable events in both governance and transport. Throughout 2007, 
planning had progressed on the three components of the Metropolitan Rail Expansion Program 
and the NSW 2007/08 Budget included funding for land acquisition for the North West Rail 
Corridor. But in late 2007, Treasury was pushing for a major reassessment of the North West 
Rail Link and a review of cheaper alternatives (Besser 2007), and commissioned a UK expert to 
report and kill off the project. There were media reports of ongoing tension between the 
Minister for Transport from the Left faction of Labor and the Treasurer from the Right faction. 
In March 2008, Premier Iemma cancelled the North West Rail Link and announced its 
replacement with the North West Metro in the SydneyLink package (NSW Government 2008). 
The North West Metro was a 40 km line from the CBD north-west to Epping, then continuing 
along the old North West Rail Link alignment to Rouse Hill. It was costed at $12 billion in May 
2008 (NSW Government 2008b). There were several perceived cost advantages of the metro rail 
strategy. With single deck carriages, the mostly underground metro rail would require smaller 
diameter tunnels than heavy rail, reducing construction costs and rollingstock costs. With a new 
operating model involving the private sector and separate industrial relations from the existing 
government heavy rail operator RailCorp, operating costs could be lower. 
The tension over the North West Metro decision and funding issues, discussed further in section 
3, led to further changes in governance and transport. In September 2008, the Minister for 
Transport (and Deputy Premier) John Watkins announced his retirement. Premier Iemma 
wanted to use the opportunity to reshuffle Cabinet, and replace the publicly unpopular 
Treasurer. But the shock result was that on 5 September 2008 Premier Iemma resigned as 
Premier and a member of parliament when it became clear that the Labor Caucus would not 
support his ministerial choices. Nathan Rees from the Left faction, who had only been in 
Parliament since the March 2007 election, was elected Premier by Caucus. The new Premier 
appointed a new Treasurer and new Ministers for Transport, Roads, Planning, and 
Infrastructure.  
A month later in October 2008, the new Premier announced the cancellation of the North West 
Metro and its replacement with the CBD Metro, a 7 km truncated form of the North West Metro 
from the CBD to Rozelle in the inner west already well-served by public transport. At that time, 
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the CBD Metro had never appeared in any public plan or strategy, very little if any planning had 
been done, and few details were immediately available. The Premier justified the very high cost 
of $4.8 billion for 7 km as the project would form the spine of a future metro rail network yet to 
be announced. Premier Iemma’s North West Metro lasted only six months as a project. In 
November 2008, the new Treasurer released a mini-budget, necessary due to an economic 
downturn, which delayed (if not cancelled) the South West Rail Link and CBD Rail Link to 
save costs.  
2.4  Premier Keneally – new transport institution and transport plan 
The discontinuity continued in 2009. In June 2009, Premier Rees announced major public sector 
reform with the creation of 13 super-departments including NSW Transport and Infrastructure. 
Rees described it as “the most significant shake-up of the delivery of transport services in NSW 
history”, as “a new super-agency NSW Transport and Infrastructure would take control of all 
transport and roads coordination, policy and planning functions” (Rees 2009). He stated an 
immediate priority was developing a Transport Blueprint to integrate urban growth and 
transport delivery. 
The new Department of Transport and Infrastructure reported to four Ministers (Infrastructure, 
Ports and Waterways, Roads, and Transport) and staff from a number of other transport 
agencies performing certain transport planning, policy and coordination functions were 
transferred to the new Department. There had been increasing calls for an integrated transport 
authority including from the Shadow Minister for Transport Gladys Berejiklian (NSW 
Liberals/Nationals Coalition 2008). The new super-department of NSW Transport and 
Infrastructure was supported by ministerial changes in September 2009, when the existing 
Minister for Transport, David Campbell also became Minister for Roads and a Minister was 
appointed to assist the Minister for Transport. It was the first time since March 2003 that the 
portfolios of Transport and Roads had been held by the same Minister. 
The announcement of the development of a Transport Blueprint integrating urban growth and 
transport growth continued the government’s commitment to public transport stated in previous 
plans including the Metropolitan Strategy (December 2005), Draft Subregional Strategies for 10 
subregions (2007-June 2008), Urban Transport Statement (November 2006), State Plan 
(November 2006), SydneyLink plan (March 2008) and the State Infrastructure Strategy (May 
2008). In November 2009, Premier Rees announced that the $1.3 billion Stage 2 of the South 
West Rail Link, deferred in the November 2008 mini-budget, would proceed in 2010 for 
completion in 2016.  
Throughout the second half of 2009 there had been media speculation about the future of both 
the CBD Metro and Premier Rees, with Coultan (2009) reporting that the CBD Metro was likely 
to die with Rees’ premiership. Within Labor, there were tensions from Rees’ ministerial 
reshuffle in September 2009 and increasing dissatisfaction with the Premier. In December 2009, 
Premier Rees resigned as Premier when he lost the support of the Caucus and faced an 
unwinnable challenge. The Minister for Planning Kristina Keneally, supported by the Right 
faction, became Premier. The Sydney Metropolitan Herald reported extensively on the 
comprehensive Transport Blueprint Premier Rees had been due to release the day before his 
resignation (West 2009a, 2009b). With the rise of Premier Keneally, the Rees Transport 
Blueprint was buried. Once Keneally became Premier, there was pressure for her to cancel the 
poorly conceived and received CBD Metro project. 
In February 2010, two weeks after The Sydney Morning Herald’s Independent Inquiry into 
Public Transport released its 450 page preliminary report, the Government released its 45 page 
10 year Metropolitan Transport Plan (NSW Government 2010), a rewritten Transport Blueprint 
which included the cancellation of the CBD Metro project. The North West Rail Link was back 
in the Plan, but press releases indicated construction was to commence in 2017 for completion 
in 2024, beyond the 10 years of the Plan. The Plan also included the Western Express City 
Relief Line to enhance CBD rail capacity as a higher rail priority than the North West Rail Link. 
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The government’s State Plan, updated and reissued by Premier Keneally in March 2010 (NSW 
Government 2010b), continued the previous commitment to improve public transport and the 
public transport mode share targets were extended to more centres in addition to the CBD.  
In May 2010, the Premier appointed new Ministers for Transport and Roads when the Minister 
for Transport and Roads resigned suddenly for personal reasons, which split the portfolios again 
after only five months of being combined. In July 2010, a new transport super-department was 
created in which the one year old NSW Transport and Infrastructure became Transport NSW. 
The aim of greater coordination in transport policy and planning appeared to be the same as the 
previous restructure a year ago, but with a stronger central agency, a single budget, and the 
independence of the operational agencies reduced with their statutory boards removed. The 
Minister said “the new agency Transport NSW will integrate the operation and planning of all 
modes of transport including trains, buses, ferries, cars and bicycles” (Robertson 2010).  
2.5  Premier O’Farrell – change of government 
At the NSW state election in March 2011, the community voted in a change of government 
from Labor to the Liberal/Nationals after 16 years. In a landslide result, Labor received its 
lowest ever primary vote of 25% and won only 20 seats out of 93 in the Legislative Assembly of 
Parliament (down from 52 seats). The new Premier Barry O’Farrell appointed new ministers. In 
campaigning for the election, the (then) Opposition emphasised its commitment to build the 
North West and South West Rail Links the previous government had promised but not 
delivered. However, the change of government has the potential to cause further disruption and 
restructuring within transport agencies and changes to transport priorities. After the election, the 
new Minister for Transport announced a restructure of Transport NSW into Transport for NSW. 
3. Causes of discontinuity – funding for transport 
This section discusses the contribution of conflicts over transport funding to the discontinuity in 
governance and transport planning decisions. There were complex, inter-related causes of the 
changes in premiers and ministers including personality and factional conflicts between 
members of the same government, and different views on priorities and funding. There were 
also ministerial changes due to a string of personal scandals. But both governance and transport 
changes in NSW are strongly related to conflicts over funding transport infrastructure, and the 
implications of project costs and different sources of funds. The discontinuity also had 
compounding effects, with each new Premier desperate to address the previous lack of progress, 
and leave a legacy as the public transport premier. 
Funding for transport is a source of conflict as transport infrastructure is expensive, and costs 
usually increase over time as projects progress through the planning, development, assessment 
and construction phases. The many stakeholders have conflicting views on appropriate funding 
sources for transport, with different views from existing residents, new residents, local 
government, transport workers, workers in other unions, developers, and the private sector. In 
Sydney, each potential source of funds for transport has generated conflict whether it is 
infrastructure levies on new housing in growth areas, electricity privatisation with threats to 
electricity jobs, industrial relations reform with threats to rail jobs, private sector involvement 
such as toll roads, an aversion to debt in order to maintain a “triple A” credit rating, sales of 
public assets, and conditions attached to funds from the federal government. The government 
had recognised the importance of funding in transport, with the Minister for Transport Services 
(later the Treasurer) commissioning a ministerial inquiry on the financial sustainability of public 
transport in 2003 (NSW Ministry of Transport 2003b). 
In terms of government changes, a major factor in the destabilisation and resignation of Premier 
Iemma and Treasurer Costa in 2008 was their support for privatisation of the electricity sector to 
generate funds for major infrastructure projects, in the face of very strong opposition from the 
Labor Party and unions. At the Labor Party NSW state conference in May 2008, 85% of 
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delegates opposed privatisation after Premier Iemma and other Ministers spoke in favour. At the 
time, it was reported that “Mr Iemma’s leadership is now under serious threat” (Carty and 
Gilmore 2008). Iemma and Costa’s failure to privatise the electricity sector and the conflict with 
the unions at the conference is analysed by Benson (2010). 
When Costa resigned from Parliament in October 2008, he expressed concerns about the state of 
NSW finances: “The state has no choice but to delay the proposed North West Metro project if 
it is to avoid losing its Triple A credit rating in the coming months” (Robins 2008). Costa was 
replaced by John Robertson, the Secretary of Unions NSW and leading opponent of electricity 
privatisation plans, who became Minister for Transport with the challenge of funding major 
infrastructure. 
In terms of transport planning and funding, one of the attractions of metro rail over heavy rail in 
early 2008 was the potential for a new operational model with private sector involvement. In 
October 2008, Premier Rees changed from the more expensive North West Metro to the shorter 
CBD Metro project in an (unsuccessful) attempt to attract federal government infrastructure 
funding. The conflicting imperatives behind the CBD Metro decision are summarised by 
Coultan (2009) as firstly “the apparent desire of the Premier to overcome the deeply ingrained 
public cynicism of cancelled transport projects, by announcing a plan – any plan”, and secondly 
“to protect the metro against those in his government who, faced with the collapse of state 
revenues, wanted to scale back big capital works programs” such as the North West Metro. 
But the discontinuity in planning contributed to NSW missing out on federal government 
funding for public transport. When the federal government announced its first round of Nation 
Building funding for public transport infrastructure in May 209, assessed by Infrastructure 
Australia, NSW received only $91 million for continuing planning of the West Metro from the 
CBD to Parramatta, while other states received much more – Victoria received $3.2 billion for 
Regional Rail Express, Queensland received $365 million for Gold Coast Light Rail and South 
Australia received almost $600 million for rail projects. The media reported that the federal 
government was not impressed with NSW submissions for funding and NSW was widely 
criticised for not having an integrated transport plan or strategy, and for poor quality 
presentations (Clennell et al. 2009). The federal advisory body Infrastructure Australia also had 
two people in senior positions with experience of transport in NSW: its Co-ordinator-General 
Michael Deegan was a former NSW Director-General of Transport, while its General Manager 
Planning, Stephen Alchin, had been Executive Director Transport Planning and Infrastructure in 
the transport department before the 2005 restructure.  
The lack of success with the federal government weakened Premier Rees and contributed to his 
replacement as Premier. Premier Keneally’s decision in early 2010 to cancel the metro rail and 
return to heavy rail revealed the high cost of discontinuity. The NSW Audit Office (2010) 
reported that $412 million had been spent on metro rail projects at 30 June 2010 with more costs 
expected in 2010-11, of which $356 million was expenditure with no future benefit to NSW. 
This inefficient use of resources meant even less money was available for transport projects. 
Stakeholders including economists, public transport experts and the Greens Party have 
expressed concerns about the high cost of rail projects in Sydney relative to other Australian 
states, with suspicions that Treasury may have inflated costs to make public transport projects 
less attractive (West 2010). A NSW Parliamentary inquiry has been initiated into methods used 
to cost rail projects in NSW. 
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4. Impacts of discontinuity in governance 
The discontinuity in governance and planning has had impacts in several areas including the 
timing of transport projects, inefficient use of resources, loss of stakeholder trust and 
confidence, and loss of professional and corporate knowledge. 
4.1 Impacts on public transport 
A major impact of discontinuity and reversal of transport decisions has been delays to delivery 
of public transport projects, and impacts on public transport use. Table 1 summarises decisions 
about rail projects. The most serious impact is that the North West Rail Link, originally 
proposed in 1998 for completion in 2010, was in 2010 due for completion in 2024. The North 
West Rail Link was planned to serve the North West, a new growth area with high rates of car 
use (TPDC 2006) and poor public transport access. The North West and South West subregions 
are the worst performing of the 10 subregions in Sydney on the State Plan measure of 
households with access within 30 minutes by public transport to a strategic centre. The delay in 
the delivery of the North West Rail Link has entrenched high levels of car use in the north-west 
amongst existing and new residents, and limited access to major employment centres by public 
transport. Many residents purchased in the area with an expectation of the rail line. Public 
transport to the CBD is being provided by high speed, long distance bus services which struggle 
to keep up with growth in demand and contribute to congestion in the CBD due to poor 
facilities. 
Even though the new government supports the North West Rail Link, the cancellation and 
reinstatement of the project mean previous planning, design and consultation work must be 
reviewed and updated at increased cost. The new government has only committed to starting the 
NWRL in its first four-year term of government (2011-2015), and a completion date is unclear, 
but likely to be beyond 2020. A current total cost for the North West Rail Link is not publicly 
stated, but delays have increased the cost of both land acquisition and construction. 
Construction costs have increased faster than general inflation due to competition for resources 
from the booming mining industry in Australia. 
The NSW Auditor-General (Audit Office 2010, p. 13) noted that the cost of the metro rail 
cancellation decision included time delays to other transport priorities as scarce resources are 
diverted to projects that do not proceed to completion.  
As well as impacts on rail projects identified in Table 1, there have also been delays to bus, light 
rail and road projects, partly due to costs. The seven Transitways identified in Action for 
Transport 2010 in 1998 became a network of 43 Strategic Bus Corridors following the 
Unsworth Review of Bus Services in 2004, with a lower level of physical road priority. Of the 
seven original Transitways, only two have been constructed: the Liverpool-Parramatta 
Transitway opened in February 2003 shortly before the March 2003 state election, and the 
North West Transitway opened in February 2007, shortly before the March 2007 state election. 
The concept of Strategic Bus Corridors appears to have been replaced in 2010 by the Metrobus 
concept of high frequency services on fewer corridors. Although new toll roads have been built 
recently in Sydney (Cross City Tunnel and Westlink M7 in 2005 and Lane Cove Tunnel in 
2007), planning for new road projects has been affected by the high turnover of Roads Ministers 
and lack of continuity, and difficulties in funding expensive tunnel projects through more tolls. 
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Table 1:  Summary of impact of discontinuity in governance on rail projects in Sydney 
Date Announcement (and proposed completion date) Premier Minister for 
Transport 
Nov 1998 Parramatta Rail Link (2006) 
North West Rail Link announced (2010) 
Bob Carr Carl Scully 
Mid 2003 Parramatta-Epping Rail Link “deferred” Bob Carr Michael Costa 
June 2005 Metropolitan Rail Expansion Program announced  
= NWRL 2017 + SWRL 2012 + CBD Rail Link 2017 
Bob Carr John Watkins 
Nov 2006 North West Rail Link accelerated (Stage 1 2015) Morris Iemma John Watkins 
March 2008 North West Rail Link cancelled 
North West Metro announced (+West Metro studies) 
Morris Iemma John Watkins 
Oct 2008 North West Metro cancelled 
CBD Metro announced  
Nathan Rees David Campbell 
Nov 2008 South West Rail Link and CBD Rail Link staged/delayed  Nathan Rees David Campbell 
May 2009 West Metro planning studies Nathan Rees David Campbell 
Nov 2009 South West Rail Link-Stage 2 announced (2016) Nathan Rees David Campbell 
Feb 2010 CBD Metro cancelled 
North West Rail Link re-instated (2024) 
Western Express City Relief Line announced (2015-2020)  
Kristina Keneally David Campbell 
Aug 2010 Parramatta-Epping Rail Link announced (federal govt) Kristina Keneally John Robertson 
March 2011 Change of NSW government 
North West Rail Link prioritised (date TBC) 
Barry O’Farrell Gladys Berejiklian 
 
4.2 Impacts on stakeholder trust and confidence 
The discontinuity in NSW has created a loss of stakeholder trust and confidence by a range of 
stakeholders including the community and planning professionals. The federal government’s 
loss of confidence in the NSW government and impact on funding was discussed previously. 
The discontinuity created a perception that Sydney’s transport was not keeping up with 
population growth and economic demands, and contributed to a lack of confidence in the ability 
of government to deliver public transport.  
Impacts on community trust and confidence are shown in several ways. The ultimate expression 
of community dissatisfaction with the Labor government was the election result in March 2011, 
which had been foreshadowed by opinion polling for a long time leading up to the election. 
Quarterly surveys of transport confidence also indicate the community’s dissatisfaction with 
transport in NSW: NSW residents are the most pessimistic of the states about transport in their 
local area (Hensher and Daniels 2011). Just as discontinuity had a compounding impact on 
premiers and ministers, it also had a compounding effect on the community. 
The community loss of trust and cynicism about project delivery was highlighted in the 
response to the federal Labor government’s announcement during the federal election campaign 
in August 2010 that it would fund the Parramatta-Epping Rail Link with $2.1 billion funding 
starting in 2014, but requiring a contribution of $500 million from the NSW government. The 
announcement was received with much cynicism, and may even have backfired as an election 
promise as Labor lost the very marginal federal seat which would have benefited from the rail 
line. Media reports suggested a lack of consultation with the NSW government over the 
announcement. Although the rail line was a long planned project, having been identified in 1998 
in Action for Transport 2010 and “deferred” in 2003, its integration into the rail network in 
2010 and its relationship with the North West Rail Link at Epping was not clear. The NSW 
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government’s highest priority at the time was the Western Express project to increase capacity 
on the existing heavy rail network. 
The decision in early 2008 to cancel the North West Rail Link and replace it with metro rail 
attracted much public criticism and opposition from stakeholders usually supportive of public 
transport such as the Planning Institute of Australia, the peak body representing planning 
professionals, and community group EcoTransit Sydney (EcoTransit 2008). The decision was 
inconsistent with the integrated transport and land use principles of the Metropolitan Strategy as 
the replacement North West Metro did not connect to Macquarie Park, a significant employment 
centre identified as a Specialised Centre in the Metropolitan Strategy. The North West Rail Link 
would have provided a direct link between the North West Growth Centre and Macquarie Park, 
whereas the North West Metro would require users to change from metro to heavy rail at 
Epping. The Planning Institute noted “The announcement of the North West Metro and its 
connectivity with Victoria Rd overturns years of careful planning by the State Government to 
integrate land use and transport planning for Sydney’s global city corridor” (Planning Institute 
of Australia 2008). The Sydney Morning Herald reported the concerns on the front page (Besser 
2008a) and with an editorial (SMH 2008) noting “The Planning Institute of Australia's warning 
about the proposed North West Metro should have everyone in the State Government pulling up 
for a quick rethink.” 
The subsequent decision to replace the North West Metro with the shorter CBD Metro also 
attracted public criticism from stakeholders about the high cost, its relationship to other modes 
and transfers, low patronage forecasts, the lack of planning of the metro rail network, and the 
equity of prioritising the well-served inner west.  
The former NSW Co-ordinator General of Rail was publicly critical of the metro decisions and 
later agreed to head The Sydney Morning Herald’s Independent Inquiry in public transport 
planning, discussed below. The Property Council of Australia’s representative resigned from the 
Transport Blueprint Reference Panel when the replacement Metropolitan Transport Plan fell a 
long way short of what the industry was seeking. 
The failure in government transport planning and widespread concern encouraged the major 
Sydney newspaper, The Sydney Morning Herald, to assume a government role in planning, 
harnessing a team of frustrated planning professionals. Shortly after the government announced 
the development of its Transport Blueprint in mid 2009, the newspaper announced in August 
2009 that it was establishing its own Independent Public Inquiry to create a Long Term Public 
Transport Plan for Sydney to inform decisions by future governments on the priorities over the 
next 30 years. Its editorial on the day of the Inquiry launch was titled “When governments fail, 
the public must set the agenda” (SMH 2009, p. 10). The Inquiry was filling a policy vacuum 
created by the government (Daniels et al. 2011).  
The Independent Public Inquiry was chaired by a former senior road and rail bureaucrat, 
assisted by a team of independent experts including academics, public servants and/or 
consultants who mostly donated their time. The Inquiry set up its own website and conducted an 
inquiry similar to a government process with public forums and public submissions, a 
preliminary and final report, and recommendations (Independent Inquiry 2010). It attracted 490 
submissions from the community. The Inquiry’s 450 page preliminary report on planning, 
governance and funding in February 2010 was more comprehensive than the government’s own 
45 page Metropolitan Transport Plan released two weeks later. By committing to such an 
intensive project, The Herald confirmed that public transport planning was an important issue of 
concern and interest to its readers. Other non-government involvement in transport planning 
includes transport plans produced by the community group 10,000 Friends of Greater Sydney 
(2007, 2009).  
The breakdown in trust amongst both community, industry and professional stakeholders makes 
it more difficult for any government to propose new initiatives or new mechanisms to fund 
transport, as each new announcement is greeted with disbelief, scepticism or simply ignored. 
Engagement and consultation becomes increasingly more difficult. For instance, Premier Rees’ 
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mini-budget decision in November 2008 to introduce a small parent co-payment towards the 
School Student Transport Scheme for free travel was overturned following community 
backlash. 
4.3  Impacts on professional and corporate knowledge 
The changes in Premier and Minister for Transport were accompanied by changes in the 
management of the central agencies of Premier and Cabinet, and Treasury, and in operational 
transport agencies with a loss of professional and corporate knowledge. The high rate of change 
meant loss of continuity within institutions on the history of projects and on strategic issues. 
Shortly after the change from Premier Iemma to Rees in 2008, the Director-General of Premier 
and Cabinet resigned. And with the new Premier Keneally in December 2009, there was a new 
Director-General of Premier and Cabinet. Treasury has been more stable, although the long-
term Secretary resigned in November 2008 to join the federal public sector following the poorly 
received Rees mini-budget.  
Changes at the ministerial level were accompanied by turnover of senior staff at the key 
transport agencies. As early as February 2006, The Sydney Morning Herald highlighted the 
changes in transport chiefs with 17 bosses in 10 years (Baker 2006). The changes have 
continued since then: between the March 2003 and March 2011 elections, there have been four 
Ministers for Transport, seven Ministers for Roads and four Director-Generals of Transport, 
hindering continuity of policy and planning. 
In terms of transport planning resources, constant restructuring of departments led to a loss of 
professional skills, experience and corporate knowledge in the public sector as staff left due to 
redundancies, uncertainty, and dissatisfaction with lack of direction. The Sydney Metro 
Authority established in February 2009 with many staff from existing agencies was operational 
for only a year before the metro rail project was cancelled, the authority disbanded and its staff 
redistributed. Institutional changes have continued with the new government restructuring the 
Department of Transport into Transport for NSW and appointing six new Deputy Director-
Generals, with only one from within the transport department. 
The organisational restructuring in the central transport agency is also apparent in operational 
rail agencies in NSW. In 1996, as part of national competition policy reform, the NSW rail 
operator was broken up into several agencies: State Rail Authority, Rail Services Authority 
(RSA), Rail Access Corporation (RAC), and a freight corporation. In 2001 RSA and RAC 
merged to become Rail Infrastructure Corporation, and in 2004 the metropolitan functions of 
Rail Infrastructure Corporation and the State Rail Authority were amalgamated into RailCorp 
and non-metropolitan freight lines were leased to the Australian Rail Track Corporation.  
5. Discussion and conclusion 
The NSW experience is not intended to suggest that change in representatives or projects is 
always negative or to be avoided. There is a tension in determining the appropriate balance 
between stability and change. Transport planning and project delivery, particularly of large 
infrastructure projects, occurs over the long-term and stability and continuity is required to 
implement plans and projects with long time horizons. Long term land use and transport 
strategic plans are important for the signals they send to all stakeholders – the community, other 
government agencies and the private sector – which guide many different decisions in other 
sectors.  
But it is also important to recognise when institutional structures must change to meet changing 
circumstances or priorities or when plans must be changed. Other Australian states have also 
experimented with different institutional structures to achieve the well-recognised goal of 
integrated planning including integrating planning and operations within transport, integrating 
across transport modes, as well as integrating transport planning and land use planning with 
versions of super-departments involving combinations of transport, planning and infrastructure, 
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with or without natural resources. Changes in the structure of both departments and operational 
agencies also reflect cycles of aggregation and disaggregation over time. But in NSW, the dis-
establishment of the integrated department was related more to the resignation of the Minister, 
not the function of the department. 
In NSW, eight years of change tipped the balance too far away from stability and continuity 
towards change and discontinuity. The experience demonstrates three lessons. Firstly, there was 
cumulatively too much change which had compounding negative impacts. Change might be 
expected and desired with a change of political party, but in NSW, the same political 
administration Labor government was in power for 16 years from 1995 to 2011. Within the 
same administration from 2003 to 2011, there was a high rate discontinuity in governance with 
changes in Premiers and Ministers and related institutional restructuring of departments, and 
associated changes in transport plans and projects. The negative impacts of discontinuity 
included delays to projects, waste of scarce resources, loss of stakeholder trust and confidence, 
and loss of professional and corporate knowledge. In the worst example of project delays, the 
North West Rail Link, planned in 1998 for completion in 2010, was planned in 2010 for 
completion in 2024 after being accelerated, cancelled, replaced and reinstated. The South West 
Rail Link planned in 2005 for completion in 2012 was now in 2010 planned for 2016. The 
decision to abandon the CBD Metro rail project less than 18 months after its announcement and 
return to a heavy rail project wasted over $400 million of scarce funds. 
Secondly, conflict over funding for transport within government contributed to changes in 
Premiers from 2008, and the associated flow-on impacts on Ministers, institutions, plans and 
projects. The inability of premiers to generate funds through electricity privatisation, private 
sector involvement or from the federal government led to their downfall. There was conflict 
over funding for transport within government including the source of funds and what that 
involves, whether it is infrastructure levies, electricity privatisation, industrial relations reform, 
toll roads, or private sector involvement as the many stakeholders in transport have often 
conflicting views on appropriate funding sources. Each potential source of funds for transport 
generated conflict. In addition, the government was not able to harness demonstrated 
community support for public transport improvements to generate funding to deliver public 
transport. 
Thirdly, a stated commitment to improve public transport repeated in a range of strategic 
planning documents from 1998 to 2010 was not enough to deliver public transport. The 
government commitment to public transport stated in integrated transport and land use plans 
was not sufficient as the government was not able to deliver on its policy and planning goal of 
public transport. Identifying long-term funding sources is clearly important to ensure the goals 
for public transport articulated in strategic plans are delivered. Many decisions were made by 
Premiers determined to leave a public transport legacy. Instead, the legacy is of delay, waste and 
cynicism. 
The remarkable discontinuity in transport governance in NSW when transport planning went off 
the rails will have long-term impacts as it will take time to overcome the backlog in public 
transport projects, regain Sydney’s transport competitiveness with other cities, restore public 
trust and confidence, and overcome car dependent travel behaviour established in growth areas 
without public transport. With the change in government following the state election in March 
2011, the major transport commitment of the new government is to build the North West Rail 
Link, a project first promised in 1998, to restore trust and confidence. For the North West Rail 
Link, the planning accelerations, cancellations and reversals to return to the original project 
have wasted valuable funds while project costs have increased over time. But transport planning 
is never wasted as previous work informs future policies and projects. 
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Appendix A – Supporting information for Figure 1 
Table A1:  NSW Premiers and Ministers in transport, roads and planning portfolios  
Current at September 2011 
 
Portfolio Dates Name 
Premier Dates Premier 
 4 April 1995 – 3 August 2005 Bob Carr 
 3 August 2005 – 5 September 2008 Morris Iemma 
 5 September 2008 – 4 December 2009 Nathan Rees 
 4 December 2009 – 28 March 2011 Kristina Keneally 
 28 March 2011 – current  Barry O’Farrell 
Treasurer Dates Treasurer 
 3 April 1995 – 21 January 2005 Michael Egan 
 21 January 2005 – 3 August 2005 Andrew Reshauge 
 3 August 2005 – 17 February 2006 Morris Iemma 
 17 February 2006 – 5 September 2008 Michael Costa 
 8 September 2008 – 28 March 2011 Eric Roozendaal 
 28 March 2011 – current  Michael Baird 
Transport Dates Minister for Transport 
 1 December 1997 – 2 April 2003 Carl Scully 
 2 April 2003 – 21 January 2005 Michael Costa 
 21 January 2005 – 5 September 2008 John Watkins 
 8 September 2008 – 4 December 2009 David Campbell 
Tr and Roads 8 December 2009 – 21 May 2010 David Campbell 
 21 May 2010 – 28 March 2011 John Robertson 
 28 March 2011 – current  Gladys Berejiklian 
Roads Dates Minister for Roads 
 28 November 1996 – 21 January 2005 Carl Scully 
 21 January 2005 – 3 August 2005 Michael Costa 
 3 August 2005 – 17 February 2006  Joe Tripodi 
 17 February 2006 – 5 September 2008  Eric Roozendaal 
 8 September 2008 – 14 September 2009 Michael Daley 
 14 September 2009 – 21 May 2010 David Campbell 
 21 May 2010 – 28 March 2011 David Borger 
 28 March 2011 – current  Duncan Gay 
Planning Dates Minister for Planning 
 4 April 1995 – 8 April 1999 Craig Knowles 
 8 April 1999 – 2 April 2003 Andrew Reshauge 
 2 April 2003 – 3 August 2005  Craig Knowles 
 3 August 2005 – 5 September 2008  Frank Sartor 
 8 September 2008 – 4 December 2009 Kristina Keneally 
 8 December 2009 – 28 March 2011 Tony Kelly 
 28 March 2011 – current  Brad Hazzard 
Source: www.parliament.nsw.gov.au  
Note: Ministers Assisting Minister for Transport not shown. 
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Table A2:  Strategic plans in NSW – transport, land use and infrastructure 
 
Release date Title 
November 1998 Action for Transport 2010 
December 2005 Metropolitan Strategy: A City of Cities 
May 2006 State Infrastructure Strategy 2006-07 to 2015-16 
November 2006 Urban Transport Statement 
November 2006 State Plan: A New Direction for NSW (Iemma) 
March 2008 SydneyLink 
May 2008 State Infrastructure Strategy 2008-09 – 2017-18 
November 2009 State Plan (Rees) 
December 2009 (unreleased) Transport Blueprint 
February 2010 Metropolitan Transport Plan 
March 2010 State Plan (Keneally) 
December 2010 Metropolitan Plan 
September 2011 State Plan: NSW 2021 (O’Farrell) 
 
 
Table A3:  Key dates in NSW 
 
Date Event 
March 1995 State election – Labor government elected for term 1 
March 1999 State election – Labor government re-elected for term 2 
March 2003 State election – Labor government re-elected for term 3 
June 2003 Parramatta Rail Link: Epping-Parramatta stage deferred 
July 2003 Structure: Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources 
January 2005 New Ministers 
June 2005 Metropolitan Rail Expansion Program announced: NWRL, SWL, CBDRL 
September 2005 New Premier Iemma and new Ministers, DIPNR disbanded 
December 2005 Metropolitan Strategy released 
November 2006 New transport plan (Urban Transport Statement) released, NWRL 
accelerated 
March 2007 State election – Labor government re-elected for term 4 
November 2007 Federal election – Change of government: Labor government elected 
March 2008 North West Metro announced to replace North West Rail Link 
September 2008 New Premier Rees and new Ministers 
October 2008 North West Metro cancelled, CBD Metro announced 
May 2009 Federal budget announced, funding for West Metro planning studies 
June 2009 13 super-departments announced inc NSW Transport and Infrastructure 
September 2009 Minister for Transport and Roads combined (David Campbell) 
December 2009 New Premier Keneally 
February 2010 New transport plan released (Metropolitan Transport Plan), CBD Metro 
cancelled 
May 2010 New Minister for Transport (John Robertson) 
July 2010 New transport department announced: Transport NSW 
August 2010 Federal election – funding for Parramatta-Epping Rail Link announced, 
Labor government re-elected 
March 2011 State election – change of government: Liberal/Nationals government 
elected, new Premier O’Farrell and new ministers 
April, July 2011 New transport department announced: Transport for NSW (and Roads and 
Maritime Services) 
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Table A4:  Management changes in NSW transport agencies 
Current at September 2011 
 
Agency Dates Director-General, Transport 
Transport (Transport NSW, 
Ministry of Transport, NSW 
Transport and Infrastructure, 
Transport NSW, Transport for 
NSW) 
15 Nov 2000 – March 2003 Michael Deegan 
1 July 2003 – Sept 2004 John Lee 
Oct 2004 – Feb 2005 Michael Duffy (Acting) 
Feb 2005 – Nov 2005 John Lee 
Nov 2005 – Feb 2006 Jim Glasson (Acting) 
Feb 2006 – May 2009 Jim Glasson 
July 2009 – current  Les Wielinga 
Roads and Traffic Authority Dates CEO, RTA 
Dec 1999 – Oct 2005 Paul Forward 
Oct 2005 – July 2006 Mike Hannon (Acting) 
July 2006 – Feb 2009 Les Wielinga 
Feb 2009 – July 2009 Michael Bushby (Acting) 
July 2009 – current  Michael Bushby  
Rail (State Rail/RailCorp) Dates CEO, State Rail/RailCorp 
Dec 1997 – Oct 2000 Simon Lane 
Nov 2000 – June 2001 Ron Christie (Acting) 
June 2001 – Dec 2001 Lucio Di Bartolomeo (Acting) 
Dec 2001 – April 2003 Howard Lacy 
April 2003 – Dec 2003 Vince Graham (Acting) 
Dec 2003 – April 2008  Vince Graham 
April 2008 – current  Rob Mason 
State Transit Authority Dates CEO, State Transit 
May 1996 – Sept 2004 John Stott 
Sept 2004 – Nov 2004 John Lee (Acting) 
Nov 2004 – Feb 2005 John Lee 
Feb 2005 – Feb 2006 Roger Wilson (Acting) 
March 2006 – Aug 2007 John Lee 
Aug 2007 – June 2008 Peter Rowley (Acting) 
June 2008 – current  Peter Rowley 
Sydney Ferries Corporation Dates CEO, Sydney Ferries 
1 July 2004 – 22 May 2006 Sue Sinclair 
20 Feb 2006 – 24 Aug 2006 Chris Oxenbould 
21 Aug 2006 – 26 May 2009 Rear Admiral Geoff Smith 
18 March 2009 – 10 May 2010 David Callahan (Acting) 
10 May 2010 – current  David Callahan 
Source: Annual Reports, www.transport.nsw.gov.au/inquiries/walker-ferry-report.pdf  
 
